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Bahrain's Attempts at Industrial Diversification 
By Robert E. Looney * 
Introduction 
Having discovered oil before its rich neighbors, Bahrain's economic 
growth since the 1920s has been and is fueled by oil. Partly as a result of 
its trading and pearling traditions, partly because of its more developed 
educational system and partly because of its small size and the fore-
seeble depletion of its oil resources, Bahrain was one of the first Gulf 
states to industrialize and by far the most innovative in attracting 
foreign participation, including regional participation, in its industrial 
development 1. 
Signs of greater confidence in Bahrain's ability to develop its indus-
trial sector emerged after the oil price increases of the 1970s. Rapidly 
rising oil revenues gave government planners a new opportunity to 
diversify the economy and to build the necessary infrastructure for sub-
sequent industrialization. 
Despite its inability to constrain the growth of government consump-
tion, the government has managed to increase its infrastructural 
investments quite rapidly. For the most part, its direct participation in 
industrial projects has been limited. Instead, the government has been 
satisfied with providing the infrastructure capable of attracting private 
and foreign government participation in industry2. 
The purpose of this paper is to assess Bahrain's industrialization 
efforts to date. What progress has been made toward industrial diversi-
fication and in what sense? How has Bahrain's industrial performance 
co~pared with that of neighboring Arab Gulf economies? What parti-
cular problems must be overcome if the industrial diversification pro-
cess is to continue? What are the country's prospects for the future? 
• Professor, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. 
(I) Abdullah Al-Yousef, "An Evaluation of Bahrain's Major Industries and Their Future 
Prospects," in Jeffrey Nugent and Theodore Thomas eds., Bahrain and the Gulf (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1985), p. 123. 
(2) Abdullah Al-Yousef, "An Evaluation of Bahrain's Major Industries and Their Future 
Prospects," in Jeffrey Nugent and Theodore Thomas, Bahrain and the Gulf (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1985), p. 123. 
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-Overview 
Bahrain's oil reserves are strictly limited by comparison to other Gulf 
States. At its one onshore field, Jabel Al-Dukham, discovered in 1932, 
production has been declining for the last decade. Its second oil field, 
Abu Saafah, is offshore and its production is shared with Saudi Arabia. 
New oil finds are considered unlikely, although renewed exploration 
was started in the early 1980s. By contrast, the country has estimated 
non-associated gas reserves of 9 trillion cu. ft. These reserves have been 
the basis upon which Bahrain developed its energy-intensive industries. 
At an early stage in its recent economic development Bahrain ack-
nowledged that future prosperity could not by assured by dependence 
on the production of oil and gas alone. Aside from simple revenue con-
siderations, there was also the employment issue; the oil and gas sector 
has traditionally been capital-intensive. The government has therefore 
spared no effort in attempting to diversify Bahrain's economic bases. 
Early industrial ventures like the Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard 
(Asry) or the Aluminium Bahrain Company (Alba) were conceived in 
the early stages of negotiation on Gulf economic integration, as was the 
1975 decision to set up an offshore banking sector. 
By the time the second phase of industrial projects came to be consi-
dered, Bahrain was the obvious choice of location for joint Gulf ven-
tures. Precedence apart, there was also the important factor that Bah-
rain has an indigenous labor surplus that could staff new plants, whe-
reas if other Gulf states were to expand further their industrial ambi-
tions, they would face greater dependence on expatriate employees 3. 
Bahrain's private sector enterprises are largely involved in the pro-
duction of beverages, plastics, tiles, concrete blocks, matches, nails, 
industrial gases, wood products, air conditioners, food manufactures, 
system-built houses and downstream aluminium products. Traditional 
industries arising from Bahrain's island status e.g., dhow building and 
fishing also exist on a smaller scale. The government pursues a liberal 
industrial policy and encourages both domestic and foreign private 
investment in the manufacturing sector. 
Manufacturing's growth has been erratic since the 1981/82 oil price 
declines. Fairly severe contractions of the industry took place in 1982, 
1983 and 1984, with 1984 the only year prior to 1986 experiencing a 
(3) Arab Banking Corporation, The Arab Economies: Structure and Outlook, second revised edition 





positive rate of growth (Table 1). As a result, manufacturing now 
accounts for about 12 percent of Gross Domestic Product, and 16 per-
cent of non-oil GDP (Table 2), although its share in total employment is 
si~nificantly smaller. The proportion of manufactures in total exports 
has risen in recent years, while the proportion in GDP value added has 
fallen from the levels reached in the 1970s - -14 - 15 percent. 
The industrial strategy is oriented towards a rapid development of 
energy and capital-intensive heavy industries aiming at the regional 
market. Despite the recession - which has affected most Gulf countries 
since 1982 - there are no signs that plans to expand capacity in alumi-
nium, steel and petrochemicals are being shelved. Rapid diversification 
of the economy is of particular interest as oil reserves are depleted. Both 
the manufacturing and service sector (particularly banking) are expected 
to play a key role in the country's diversification efforts. 
In terms of the large publicly-owned heavy industries, there have been 
setbacks in the second phase of projects, while out of the three spea-
rheads of Bahrain's early industrialization - Bahrain Petroleum Com-
pany (Bapco), Aluminium Bahrain (Alba), and Arab Shipbuilding and 
Repair Yard Company (Asry) - only Al~a has consistently performed to 
expectation. The successful implementation of offshore banking in the 
late 1970s and 1980s also served to ·'redirect the emphasis of job and 
wealth creation within the economy, while increasing overall operating 
costs across.various sectors. 
Relative Economic Structure 
Bahrain's open and trade-oriented economy is reflected in the 100 
percent share of gross domestic expenditures attributable to both 
imports and exports, to the large contribution of trade to GDP, and to 
the small share of total output originating in the agricultural and light 
industrial sectors. The oil and gas sectors earn about two thirds of 
government revenues, but have only a 20-25 percent share of GDP. 
Unlike in other Gulf economies, where the difference between oil and 
gas's share of government revenue in GDP are approximately 95 percent 
and 55 percent and represent the disbursement of these revenues in 
government development programs, the disparity in Bahrain reflects the 
much less central role of government spending in overall economic 
activity 4. 
(4) Arab Banking Corporation The Arab Economies: Structure and Outlook, second revised edition 
(Manama, Bahrain: ABC, October 1986), p.35. 
7 
Table 1 
Bahrain: Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 1981-1986 
(BO million at constant 1980 prices) 
Sector 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Agriculture 20.8 22.2 21.1 20.3 19.9 20.0 
(6.7) (- 5.0) ( - 3.8) (-2.0) (1.5) 
Mining & Quarrying 342.3 309.2 321.1 364.1 390.5 355.7 
(-9.7) (3.8) (13.4) (7.3) (- 8.9) 
Manufacturing 176.5 154.6 142.8 153.1 140.7 205.9 
( - 12.4) (-7.6) (7.2) ( - 8.1) (39.4) 
Electricity and water 16.8 17.9 21.9 24.4 25.8 23.3 
(6.5) (22.3) (11.4) (5.7) ( - 9. 7) 
Construction 118.9 123.0 144.7 166.5 133.7 115.3 
(3.4) (17 .6) (15.1) (-19.7) (-13.8) 
Wholesale/retail trade 151.7 202.5 181.7 136.2 119.2 111.6 
(33.5) ( - 10.3) ( - 25.0) ( - 12.5) ( - 6.4) 
Communications/trans 120.5 142.0 153.8 174.3 167.1 143.0 
(17 .8) (8.3) (13.3) (-4.1) (-14.4) 
Finance 184.8 283.0 258.0 240.0 227.8 289.6 
(53.1) (- 8.8) (-7.0) (-5.1) (27 .1) 
Real Estate 79.6 83.3 86.1 91.2 81.5 80.7 
(4.6) (3.4) (5.9) ( - 10.6) (-1.0) 
Other Services 41.3 41.6 44.4 48.9 53.4 51.3 
(0.7) (6.7) (10.1) (9.2) (-3.9) 
Government Services 182.3 203.2 205.8 228.2 243.3 243.8 
(11.5) (1.3) (10.8) (6.6) (0.2) 
Non-oil GDP 1093.2 1273.1 1260.3 1283.5 1212.4 1284.5 
(16.5) (-1.0) (1.8) ( - 5.5) (5.9) 
GDP (producers values) 1435.5 1582.3 1581.4 1647.6 1602.9 1640.2 
(10.2) ( - 0.1) (4.2) (-2.7) (2.3) 
Sources: Directorate of Statistics, Statistical Abstract. 
Note: ( ) = annual rate of growth. 
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Table 2 
Bahrain: Share of Gross Domestic Product by Section, 1981- 1986. 
(percent of Gross Domestic Product, 1980 constant prices). 
Sector 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Agriculture 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 
(1.9) (1.7) (1.7) (1.6) (1.6) (1.6) 
Mining & Quarrying 23.8 19.5 20.3 22.1 24.4 21.7 
(31.3) (24.3) (25.5) (28.4) (32.2) (27 .7) 
Manufacturing 12.3 9.8 9.0 9.3 8.8 12.6 
(16.1) (12.1) (11.3) (11.9) (12.2) (16.0) 
Electricity and water 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.4 
(1.5) (1.4) (1.7) (1.9) (2.1) (1.8) 
Construction 8.3 7.8 9.2 10.1 8.3 7.0 
(10.9) (9.7) (11.5) (13.0) (11.0) (9.0) 
Wholesale/retail trade 10.6 12.8 11.5 8.3 7.4 6.8 
(13.9) (15.9) (14.4) (10.6) (9.8) (8.7) 
Communications/trans 8.4 9.0 9.7 10.6 10.4 8.7 
(11.0) (11.2) (12.2) (13.6) (13.8) (11.1) 
Finance 12.9 17.9 16.3 14.6 14.2 17.7 
(16.9) (22.2) (20.5) (18.7) (18.8) (22.5) 
Real Estate 5.5 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.1 4.9 
(7.3) (6.5) (6.8) (7 .1) (6.7) (6.3) 
Other Services 2.0 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.1 
(3.8) (3.3) (3.5) (3.8) (4.4) (4.0) 
K 
Government Services 12.7 12.8 13.0 13.9 15.2 14.9 
(16.7) (16.0) (16.3) (17 .8) (20.1) (19.0) 
'! 
Non-oil GDP 76.2 80.5 79.7 77.9 75.6 78.3 
Sources: Directorate of Statistics, Statistical Abstract. 
Note: ( ) = percent of non-oil gross domestic product. 
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To get an idea of the manner in which the Bahraini economy has 
evolved since the 1973174 oil price increases, together with a picture of 
the critical areas in which the economy differs from that of its neigh-
bors, a factor analysis of the major economic structural characteristics 
of the Arab countries was unddertaken. Based on the previous discus-
sion, and as an initial hypothesis, it was assumed that Bahrain differed 
from other Arabian Gulf countries in that it has: 
a. due to the early start of its industrialization, a larger share of output 
accounted for by manufacturing. 
b. as a result of limited reserves, a small oil sector relative to total eco-
nomic activity. 
c. as a corollary to (b) above, a relatively small government sector due 
to limited revenues. 
d. based on population and income, a relatively small economic size. 
e. based on its trading orientation and (d) above, a very open economy 
with a relatively large import component. 
To avoid as much as possible arbitrarily defining the variables used in 
the analysis, each structural feature (except size) was represented by two 
measures: (a) its share of non-oil Gross Domestic Product, and (b) its 
share of absorption (total consumption plus investment). The relative 
size of each country was depicted by its share of Arab World Gross 
Domestic Product times its share of Arab World population s. Defined 
this way, the measures represent the relative extent of development of 
each country in terms of the five major structural factors. 
Structural change over time was observed by spreading the factor 
analysis over five year intervals for the 1975-85 period. The data sample 
was taken from the Arab Monetary Fund and included the twenty Arab 
members of the Fund. 
The factor analysis identified five main trends in the data. As it 
turned out, the sectoral shares of non-oil GDP and absorption are cor-
related closely enough so that each of the factors represented one of the 
four main sectors. The resulting factor scores for each sector, therefore, 
(5) Data are for the twenty member countries of the Arab Monetary Fund, and was taken from: Arab 
Monetary Fund National Account Estimates, 1974-1985 (Abu Dhabi: Arab Monetary Fund, 
1987). 
(6) Arab Monetary Fund, National Accounts of Arab Countries, 1974-85 (Abu Dhabi: Arab Mone-
tary Fund, 1987). 
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represent the relative7 ranking of each of the twenty countries in terms 
of the development of each sector. 
More specifically, the factor scores have a mean of zero. The country 
with the highest positive factor score on a particular sector possesses the 
largest share (relative to the other nineteen countries) of that sector in its 
economy. Similarly, the country with the lowest (negative) factor score 
has the smallest share of that sector in its economy. The rest of the 
countries will rank between. Several interesting trends were identified. 
In particualr, at the beginning of the period in 1975 (Table 3): 
Tabel 3 
Arab Gulf States: Structural Evolution, 1975 - 1985 
(Factor Scores) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Manufact Oil Gov. Exp Imports Size 
Gulf Economies Structural Dimension 1975 
UAE -0.90 1.42 -1.19 0.39 -0.05 
Bahrain 2.92 -0.15 -0.50 2.31 -1.02 
Saudi Arabia 0.88 2.29 1.80 0.14 1.45 
Oman -1.37 0.76 1.43 1.84 -0.17 
Qatar -0.12 1.72 2.39 -1.84 -0.75 
Kuwait na na na na na 
Oil Economies Structural Dimension 1980 
UAE -0.02 1.28 -0.71 0.73 -0.50 
Bahrain 2.24 -0.42 -0.40 2.53 -0.87 
Saudi Arabia 0.02 0.87 1.16 0.40 2.16 
Oman -1.72 0.81 0.44 0.57 -0.52 
Qatar 0.00 1.80 1.31 -0.20 -0.84 
Kuwait 0.73 1.35 0.18 0.80 -0.50 
Oil Economies Sectorial Dimension 1985 
UAE 1.22 1.43 -1.17 -0.02 -0.50 
Bahrain 0.69 -0.37 -0.70 1.33 -0.65 
Saudi Arabia -0.31 0.39 1.73 0.48 1.25 
Oman -1.61 1.39 0.68 0.21 -0.81 
Qatar 0.54 1.34 2.11 -0.77 -0.40 
Kuwait -0.52 1.51 0.78 1.01 -O.Q7 
Notes: Factor analysis based on orthagonal rotation. Data from Arab Monetary Fund, National 
Accounts of Arab Countries, 1974-85 (Abu Dhabi: Arab Monetary Fund, 1987). 
(7) Only the results for the Gulf countries are reported here. 
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1. Bahrain was by far the leading Gulf country in terms or the relative 
development of its manufacturing sector. In fact, Saudi Arabia was 
the only other country that even remotely approached Bahrain in 
terms of the degree of industrial diversification. 
2. Aa anticipated, Bahrain possessed a relatively small oil sector. Des-
pite producing a significant absolute amount of oil, the country still 
had a negative factor score on oil when compared to other Gulf eco-
nomies. 
3. Next to the UAE, Bahrain's government sector played a considerably 
smaller role in the economy relative to the other Gulf countries. 
4. Despite possessing limited amounts of oil (and oil revenues), 
Bahrain's imports accounted for a relatively large share of domestic 
expenditures. 
5. Based on economic size determined by population and Gross 
Domestic Product, Bahrain was the smallest Gulf economy. 
By 1980: 
1. Although losing a bit of its initial head in relative industrial deve-
lopment, Bahrain still led the other Gulf countries in the share of 
economic activity accounted for by manufacturing. 
2. As a result of the expansion of hydrocarbon revenues in neighboring 
countries, Bahrain declined even further in terms of the importance 
of oil in its economy. 
3. Despite limited oil wealth, the country was by far the region's largest 
importer in terms of its non-oil GDP and absorption (total 
consumption/investment). 
Finally by 1985: 
1. Partially as a result of expansion in neighboring countries, particu-
larly the UAE and Qatar, Bahrain had suffered a significant decline 
in its level of industrial diversification. 
2. Perhaps as a result of its limited oil revenues the country also expe-
rienced a fairly large drop in its position as the most import intensive 
of the Gulf economies. 
A further understanding of the process of structural change can be 
gained from a similar factor analysis of Bahrain's sectoral change over 
same period. Again using a sample of twenty Arab world countries, the 
four main non-oil sectors of the economy were depicted by their share in 
(a) non-oil GDP and (b) absorption. 




1. At the beginning of the post-oil boom period (1975), Bahrain's eco-
nomy was dominated by the industrial sector to the extent that none 
of the other non-oil sectors accounted for a significant share of eco-
nomic activity. 
2. The 1975-80 period seems to be best characterized as one of the rapid 
expansion in distributive activities (largely finance). 
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3. The development of the financial sectors do not appear, however, to 
have been at the expense of manufacturing - in 1980 Bahrain was still 
by far the leading Gulf country in terms of its relative degree of 
industrial diversification. 
4. Again, by 1985 it is apparent that the country had lost much of its 
lead in progress towards industrial diversification. The economy had, 
however, developed more sectoral balance over the previous decade, 
with industry, distribution, construction and services all displaying 
positive factor scores. 
These trends can be best understood by examining developments in 
several of the country's major industries. 
Recent Developments in Industry 
Aluminum 
The first major industry to be developed in Bahrain was Aluminum 
Bahrain (ALBA). ALBA was established in 1968 by a consortium of six 
international companies (mainly users of aluminum) and the Govern-
ment of Bahrain, which originally held 19 percent of the shares. Bahrain 
had several advantages in attracting the aluminum industry:8 
1. The availability of cheap natural gas in large quantities, aluminum 
being an energy intensive industry. 
2. Pelatively low labor costs (at the time of initial production). 
3. In view of the capital intensity of aluminum, a favorable investment 
climate. 
In recent years the company has been a major success. Initially, 
however, the company suffered fairly high losses. By 1979, the Bahrain 
government was able to sell 20 percent of ALBA's equity to the Saudi 
Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC). The entry of SABIC in ALBA 
has been of considerable help to the Bahrain government both in redu-
cing the control of the industry by and dependence on the Kaiser Cor-
poration, and in inducing Saudi Arabia to abandonits aluminum 
smelter project in Jubail in favor of expanding the smelters in Bahrain 
and Dubai. This action helped to reduce duplication of economic acti-
vity in the region and to coordinate industrialization among the Arab 
countries of the Gulf. 
(8) Abdullah Al-Yousef, "An Evaluation of Bahrain's Major Industries and Their Future 
Prospects," in Jeffrey Nugent and Theodore Thomas, eds., Bahrain and the Gulf (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1985), pp. 124-25. 
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ALBA's success in the 1980s in competing internationally in a volatile 
industry and providing an alternative source of income for Bahrain was 
ackno~ledged at the start of 1985 when the company's board approved 
a BD60 million expansionary program. The expansion should increase 
capacity by about 25 percent over a five year period. This is its second 
expansion and on completion ALBA will have increased by 90 percent 
the smelter's original (1971) rated capacity to reach above 225,000 tons 
per year by 1991. 
Operating costs have been reduced to below the level of 10 years ago 
and are still falling-so is the staff. When the expanded capacity is func-
tional, production per employee is expected to increase four-fold. 
The long-run economic viability of ALBA is dependent on a set of 
somewhat unrelated factors, making the future profitability of the 
company difficlt to assess:9 
1. The world supply of and demand for aluminium. 
2. The movement of world energy prices and hence of Bahrain's energy 
cost advantage. 
3. World transport costs which are especially important to ALBA 
because of its distance from both the sources of alumina and markets 
for aluminum, and 
4. The development of aluminum-using industries in Bahrain and the 
Gulf. 
ALBA is currently at a major disadvantage since, as a result of the 
decrease in the relative importance of foreign company participation, 
the company is unable to take advantage of the economies of scope and 
reduced transaction costs that arise in vertically integrated operations. 
The only way in which this disadvantage could be offset would be 
through the development of aluminum-using industries, and to a certain 
extent this has taken place. In fact, the company has spawned a flou-
rishing downstream industry in Bahrain. Local sales of liquid metal, 
ex1rusion billet and rolling ingot rose by 39 percent in 1987 to 64,537 
tons. The latest firm to start operations, Gulf Aluminum Rolling Mill 
Com pay (Garmco) will eventually take 70,000 tons of rolling ingot. 10 
(9) Ibid., p. 125. 
(10) Peter Kemp, "The Future of Gulf Aluminum," Middle East Economic Survey (March 26, 1988), 
p.7. 
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Garmco began its first full year of operations in 1986, and appears to 
be able to operate on an internationally competitive basis, despite being 
designed primarily for regional demand. Of the other downstream 
manufacturers, it seems that access to Saudi markets either through 
agreement or joint ownership is a prerequisite of success. 
While aluminum prices have been increasing in recent years, there is 
some doubt that these gains can be sustained. In fact, plans to raise Gulf 
aluminum output to 750,000 - 1,000,000 tons a year are going ahead 
even though recent reports suggest that world aluminum output will rise 
even faster. However, most observers feel that much of the United 
States and European capacity is obsolete and sustained only by the cur-
rent price levels for finished metal. 
The plants in these countries do not compete in cost or quality with 
Gulf and other new producers in developing countries. In particular, 
aging plants cannot deliver the premium output for which demand is 
now greatest. A settling of the market is widely expected forcing the 
closure of swing producers in OECD countries. Once the heavy invest-
ment has been recouped, Gulf producers will be among the few that can 
survive with lower prices. II 
Shipbuilding and Repair 
The second major joint venture and industrial enterprise established 
in Bahrain was the Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard (ASRY) Which 
began operation in November 1977. Five Organization of Arab Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) each own 18.84 percent of ASRY. 
OAPEC's decision to locate ASRY in Bahrain was motivated by Bah-
rain's advantages in terms of infrastructure, industrial labor force, 
communications and transport and the well developed state of its 
commercial sector .12 
OAPEC's positive evaluation of ASRY was based more on strategic, 
long term developmental and diversification-from-oil considerations 
than on the basis of commercial profitability. As a result, ASRY's 
investors have been willing to subsidize the company's ambitious trai-
ning program for 'Arabizing' its work force. 
(II) Ibid. 
(12) Al-Yousef, op. cit., p. 127 
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ASRY's ability to compete for business both within the region and the 
world as a whole is limited by the fact that shipbuilding and repair is a 
labor-intensive industry and Bahrain is a relatively high wage country. 
Since low wage competitors are quite far away, its location is certainly 
advantageous. The extent of this advantage is gratly reduced by compe-
tition from the large and nearby Dubai Shipyard and Dry-dock which 
was established almost simultaneously with ASRY, but which did not 
begin its operations until later .13 
In addition to competition from the Dubai Shipyard, ASRY has suf-
fered in recent years from the general decline in tanker traffic to the 
Gulf, the further effects of the Gulf war, and from the competition 
from the Dubai Drydock Company which has undercut Asry prices by 
as much as IO percent. Success in winning onshore steel fabrication 
work is not seen as a long-term guarantee of the operation's future. 
Between 1979 and late 1981 Asry worked on an average of 110 vessles 
per year; by the mid 1980s the average was about 54. However, there are 
encouraging signs. The company has met and matched the low rates 
offered in the Far East and parts of Europe; in 1986, operating costs at 
Asry stood at BD9.1 million, down from BDl0.6 million in 1985 and 
BD13.9 million in 1984. Asry's operating costs today are half that of 
1981. The yard has expanded its sales efforts and technical capabilities 
to cover the gas and product carriers market and the repair of rigs and 
barges. In a showcase effort, Asry was the first shipyard worldwide to 
convert a VLCC into a product carrier. 
Analysts feel that as a result of these developments, the end of the 
Gulf war shoud result in the company making a profit in 1989.14 
Petrochemicals 
The Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company (GPIC) is a joint ven-
ture between Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia with equity capital of 
$ 160 million and total investment of over$ 400 million. The company 
has made the most promising start of the country's heavy industries by 
coming onstream on time (1985) and within budget. 
(13) Ibid. 
(14) As a closed shareholding company, Asry is not required to publish its figures. Apparently the 
company has not shown a profit since 1981. Arab Industry Review 1987/88, p.99. 
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The establishment of GPIC marks a new era within the Gulf as far as 
steps taken to avoid the duplication of facilities which had become so 
rampant in the mid-1970s. Due to the limited and declining supplies of 
crude oil and associated gas, the limited domestic market for petro-
chemicals and other existing bottlenecks and problems, Bahrain had 
been reluctant to develop its own petrochemical industry. GPIC resulted 
from the willingness of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to participate with 
Bahrain in a trilateral joint venture to manufacture ammonia nd 
methonal. The idea for the plant arose from Bahrain's interests in fin-
ding better uses for its natural gas and the Saudi Arabia/Kuwait interest 
in building a regional energy system. 
The marketing of its two products, ammonia and methanol, by joint 
venture partners Kuwait Petrochemicals Industries Company and Saudi 
Basic Industries Corporation (Sabic) respectively, could cause problems 
in view of ECC protectionsist measures. 
Steel 
The iron pelletizing plant built by the Arab Iron and Steel Company 
(AISCO), an offshore public shareholding company, started production 
in early 1985, but was closed three months later because orders were so 
short that it could not function at even half its installed capacity of 4 
million tons per year. Production started again in July 1985 in response 
to orders from Indian and Australian companies, and total output in 
1985 amounted to 680,000 tons. Production in 1986 was estimated to 
have reached 1.5 million tons, although the plant was again closed 
during the summer. The company was then put into liquidation follo-
wing the accumulation of some $200 million in debts. The Gulf Indus-
trial Investment Company (GIIC) a subsidiary of the Kuwait Petroleum 
Company (KPC) purchased AISCO's fixed assets and production res-
tarted in June 1988. 
In general (Aisco) has had difficulty in winning local orders, largely 
because projected demand from Iraq has been unforthcoming. This 
situation should improve with the end of the Gulf war. 
Refining 
Refining in Bahrain is undertaken by the Bahrain Petroleum Com-
pany (Bapco). The company has had difficulties in recent years stem-
ming partly from age and partly from the fact that an increasing por-
tion of its throughput is Saudi rather than Bahrain crude. Bapco has 





crude was physically in short supply, or because it could not be pro-
cessed profitably at the posted prices Saudi Arabia was seeking. The 
introduction of "netback" pricing by the Saudis, certain plant moder-
nization, and administrative reorganization have encouraged more 
optimistic future prognostications for Bapco management. 
A BD340 million plan to upgrade Bapco's Sitra refinery has been 
drawn up. The planned modernization and upgrading will install 
advanced tochnology to ensure the refinery's future competitiveness 
(the original refinery was built in 1936) and to allow for the production 
of value added products, such as gas oil and jet fuel. The feasibility 
study is expected to be complete by January 1989. 
The Bahrain National Gas Company (Bananas), producing Propane, 
Butane and Naphtha, faced during 1985 with a continued decline in the 
quantity of associated gas from the Bahrain oilfield and the quality of 
its gas feed, has benefitted from Banco's efforts to maintain the level of 
pumping. The construction of facilities to expand the gas processing 
capacity of the plant to 170.0 MMSCFD, or 55 percent above the ori-
ginal design was completed during 1986.15 
Light Industries 
Bahrain's light industries include aluminum products, concrete-
blocks, paints, mattresses, air conditioning, dairy and poultry products, 
furniture, plastic bags, paper manufacture, fiberglass units and others. 
The local clinker grinding plant is expected to be largely supplanted by 
supplies from the Saudi-Bahraini Cement Company over time, and 
generally light manufacturing prospects would seem to reside in 
increased contact with the Saudi market now that the Bahraini-Saudi 
Causeway has opened. 
Still, the question remains why small industries are not doing better 
than they are and why there are not more of them. The industrial expe-
rience is there as Bapco, Alba and Asry have trained literally hundreds 
of personnel in various industrial processes. 16 The usual reasons given 
include: 
1. Lack of confidence on the part of technical trainees, and their 
general lack of marketing skills. 
(15) Arab Industry Review 1987/88, op. cit., p. 100. 
(16) "Bahrain", Arab lndusry Review 1987/88, p.105. 
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2. Bahrain's very success in developing itself as an international banking 
and finance center. As a result even ex-Asry, Bapco or Abla employees 
with industrial skills and experience but little savings, find it almost 
impossible to raise the necessary long-term financial backing needed to 
start up an independent manufacturing industrial venture. 
Importance of the Distribution Sector 
The problem of local financing is somewhat surprising, given the fact 
that the growth of finance and other distributive trades (here defined as 
commerce, transportation and finance) has been a major factor setting 
Bahrain apart from other Gulf countries. Given that most of this 
growth occurred during a period of relatively low oil revenues but at the 
same time one in which the country maintained its relatively dominant 
position in terms of its degree of industrial diversification, it is tempting 
to conclude that the finance sector substituted oil revenues as a major 
source of industrial financing. 
While it is difficult to test this hypothesis direclty, some sense of the 
degree of interdependence of the industrial and financial sectors can be 
obtained from further factor analysis. 
Here we are particularly interested in the structural impact of distribu-
tive activities. Have these activities complemented the development of 
industry or instead have they simply helped finance a high level of 
imports, service activities and/or construction ? 
CPut differently, Bahrain is by far the most import dependent country 
in the Gulf. It is also one that during the 1975-85 decade had a signifi-
cant relative expansion in service and construction activities. Has the 
expansion of these activities been facilitated by the distribution sector at 
the expense of industrial diversification? 
Again, using two measures: (a) share of non-oil GDP and (b) share of 
absorption, for each of the main dimensions manufacturing, imports, 
services and distribution-- of the data, a factor analysis was undertaken. 
The steps involved: 
1. Examining for three separate years. Here in addition to the initial and 
terminal years of 197 5 and 1985, 1981, the end of the oil boom was 
selected for examination. 
2. Computing factor scores for each of the three years. 
3. Using steps (1) and (2) as a starting point, another set of factor 
analyses were undertaken--this time with a variable-- the share of 




4. To determine the relative influence of the distribution sector on sec-
toral development, the factor scores computed with distribution 
included (step 3) in the analysis were compared with those (steps 1 
and 2) where distribution had been omitted. 
Several patterns were identified: 
1. In the initial year (1975), distributive activities were not correlated to 
any great degree with any of the major trends in the data (Table 5). 
2. The highest standardized correlation coefficient between distributive 
activities and the sectoral dimensions examined was for construction 
(0.37) while that for manufacturing was considerably lower (0.11). 
3. At this time manufacturing and services were highly correlated. 
Table 5 
Arab world: Linkage of the 
Distribution Sector to Relative Industrialization, 1975 
(Standardized Regression Coefficients) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Manufact Construct Imports Distribution 
Oil Economies Sectoral Dimension 
Services/ absor 1.04* 0.14 -0.17 0.00 
Services/ gd p 0.80* 0.15 0.07 -0.66* 
Manufact/gdp 0.68* -0.33 0.16 0.19 
Manufact/ absor 0.56 1.31 0.21 0.41 
Construct/ absor 0.09 1.02* -0.04 0.35 
Construct/ gdp -0.11 0.94* 0.21 0.04 
lmports/gdp -0.09 0.15 0.98* -0.26 
Imports/ absor 0.08 0.03 0.90* 0.21 
Distribution 0.11 0.37 -0.06 0.93* 
(Factor Scores) 
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Table 5 (Cont.) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Manufact Construct Imports Services 
Gulf Economies Sectoral Dimension--1975 
UAE -1.07 1.99 0.52 -1.15 
Bahrain 2.86 -0.28 2.49 0.15 
Saudi Arabia 0.89 1.05 0.09 0.70 
Oman -1.51 0.99 1.78 0.21 
Qatar 0.12 1.91 -0.59 0.54 
Kuwait 0.06 -0.89 0.01 1.89 
Oil Economies Distributional Effects--1975 
UAE -1.02(=) 2.06 ( =) 0.40 ( - ) -1.26(-) 
Bahrain 2.87 (=) -0.46 (-) 2.56 (=) 0.67 ( +) 
Saudi Arabia 0.97 (=) 1.07 ( =) 0.10 (=) 0.74(=) 
Oman -1.43 (=) 1.18 (+) 1.69 (-) -0.16(-) 
Qatar -0.14(-) 1.71 (-} -0.52(=) 0.72 (+) 
Kuwait 0.18(+) -0.72 (+) 0.14 ( =) 1.61 (-} 
Notes: Factor analysis based on orthagonal rotation. Data from Arab Monetary Fund, National 
Accounts of Arab Countries, 1974-85 (Abu Dhabi: Arab Monetary Fund, 1987). Factor scores derived 
from a five factor rotation, separating manufacturing from services. Distribution = the share of dis-
tributive activities in total absorption. 
By 1981 (Table 6): 
1. Distributive activities had a high positive correlation with manufac-
turing (with a standardized regression coefficient of 0.85). 
2. As a result of the relative development of their distributive systems, 
Bahrain, Qatar and Oman were all receiveing a positive stimulus to 
their industrial diversification efforts from this source. 
3. It appears that Saudi Arabia was the only country where the relative 
underdevelopment of distributive activities was acting as a constraint 
on industrial diverification. 
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, I Table 6 
Arab World: Linkage of the 
Distribution Sector to Relative lndstrialization, 1981 
(Standardized Regression Coefficients) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Manufact Construct Imports Services 
Oil Economies Sectoral Dimension 
Manufact/ absor 0.96* 0.01 -0.05 0.09 
Manufact/gdp 0.85* 0.19 -0.01 0.09 
Distribution 0.81* -0.07 0.12 -0.21 
Construct/ abs 0.19 0.99* -0.04 -0.01 
Construct/ gdp -0.10 0.98* 0.04 -0.01 
Imports/gdp -0.14 0.07 0.98* 0.03 
Imports/ absor 0.31 -0.08 0.89* 0.02 
Services/ gdp -0.24 0.10 0.13 0.96* 
Services/abs 0.33 -0.15 -0.08 0.87* 
(Factor Scores) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Manufact Construct Imports Services 
Oil Economies Sectoral Dimension--1981 
UAE 0.63 1.21 0.11 -0.60 
Bahrain 2.38 -0.21 2.34 0.77 
Saudi Arabia 0.21 2.10 0.26 0.18 
Oman -1.59 0.17 0.45 0.33 
Qatar 0.49 0.44 -0.57 1.68 
Kuwait 0.00 -0.38 0.57 1.34 
Oil Economies Distributional Effects--1975 
UAE 0.75 ( +) 1.20 ( =) 0.11 (=) -0.61 ( =) 
Bahrain 2.76 ( +) -0.23 ( =) 2.34 ( =) 0.63 (-) 
Saudi Arabia -0.16(-) 2.16 (=) 0.19 (=) 0.36 ( +) 
Oman -1.07 ( +) 0.05 (-) 0.58 ( +) 0.04 (-) 
Qatar 0.65 ( +) 0.41 ( =) -0.55 ( =) ' 1.56 (-) 
Kuwait 0.06 (=) -0.39 (=) 0.58 ( =) 1.28 ( =) 
Notes: Factor analysis based onorthagonal rotation. Data from Arab Monetary Fund. National 
Accounts of Arab Countries, 1974-85 (Abu Dhabi: Arab Monetary Fund, 1987). 
Distribution= the share of distributive activities in t"tal absorption. 
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Finally, by 1985 (Table 7): 
1. While the stimulative effect of distributional activities on manufac-
turing had lessened a bit (standardized regression coefficient of 0.75 
vs 0.81) compared to 1981, Bahrain's development of finance and 
related activities enabled the country to continue receiving positive 
benefits from this source for its industrial diversification efforts. 
2. On the other hand, the expansion of distributive activities appears in 
part to be responsible for the slowing down of industrial diversifica-
tion in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, while its effect appears to be neu-
tral in the case of the UAE. 
In summing up these results in terms of the questions originally 
asked, the historical importance of the distributive sector to Bahrain's 
industrial development together with the problems of finance for 
smaller industry suggests that the bulk of investment from the financial 
sector has gone into larger ventures. Given the generally positive rela-
tionship between distributional activities and industrial diversification 
in the arab world, together with the slowdown in industrial diversifica-
tion in the 1980s, one can only conclude that the offshore banks have 
not aided significantly in creating an environment for expanded small 
scale industrial development. 
In addition, the results obtained above suggest that current problems 
of the financial sector will also most likely have an adverse impact on 
general economic conditions and certainly on the amount of investment 
that flows into new industrial ventures. As one banker recently com-
mented: 17 
"There is an extraordinary demoralization on the island. From a 
financial point of view it's a disaster. I've recently been asking myself 
what on earth are we doing in Bahrain'". 
While many of these banks are off shore and do not lend to local 
industry, there may be a ripple effect into the domestic markets. The 
onshore banks have been hurt by the post 1982 recession. Given the 
defaults the unsympathetic attitude of the country, banks in Bahrain 
have much less chance of recovering their loans from the forced sale of 
their debtors assets than they would in the West. About ten of the offs-
hore banks have left the island. Most of those that remain have closed 
their dealing rooms or greatly reduced their staff. In effect, they are 
little more than representative offices. 





Arab World: Linkage of the 
Distribution Sector to Relative Industrialization, 1985 
(Standard Regression Cofficients) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Manufact Construct Imports Services 
Oil Economies Sectoral Dimension 
Manufact/ absor 0.91* -0.08 -0.06 0.14 
Manufact/gdp 0.86* 0.16 0.00 0.14 
Distribution 0.75* -0.03 0.08 -0.27 
Imports/ absor 0.14 0.99* 0.00 -0.03 
Imports/ gdp -0.12 0.96* -0.01 0.02 
Construct/ gdp -0.08 0.07 0.99* 0.01 
Construct/gdp -0.11 -0.08 0.95* 0.04 
Services/ gdp -0.13 0.10 0.06 0.97* 
Services/ absor 0.11 -0.12 -0.01 0.92* 
(Factor Scores) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Manufact Construct Imports Services 
Oil Economies Sectoral Dimension--1985 
UAE 1.14 1.22 0.05 -0.01 
Bahrain 0.88 0.41 1.41 0.61 
Saudi Arabia -0.12 1.60 0.56 0.54 
Oman -1.47 0.38 0.32 0.20 
Qatar 0.70 0.32 -0.72 2.78 
Kuwait -0.34 -0.89 1.11 0.94 
Oil Economies Distributional Effects--1985 
UAE 1.54 (=) 1.22 ( =) 0.06 (=) -0.01 (=) 
Bahrain 1.41 ( +) 0.47 ( =) 1.40 ( =) 0.38 (-) 
Saudi Arabia -0.46 (-) 1.55 (=) 0.56 (=) 0.66 ( +) 
Oman -1.05 ( +) 0.46 ( =) 0.26 (=) -0.07 (-) 
Qatar 0.80 ( +) 0.33 ( =) -0.71(=) 2.62 (-) 
Kuwait -0.64 (-) -0.94(=) 1.11 (=) 1.03 ( =) 
Notes: Factor analysis based onorthagonal rotation. Data from Arab Monetary Fund. National 
Accounts of Arab Countries, 1974-85 (Abu Dhabi: Arab Monetary Fund, 1987). 
Distribution= the share of distributive activities in total absorption. 
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Bahrain's situation is particularly acute because it is the only one of 
the Arabian Peninsula oil states that has a working class. The other 
countries all have sufficient oil revenues to enable their citizens to 
become landlords, businessmen or civil servants; industrial jobs are 
done by immigrants. Because of its small oil reserves and declining ser-
vice sector, the country has to turn more and more to industry for new 
jobs. About 4,000 school graduates come into the job market each year. 
By the end of the century the labor force is expected to double. 18 
Despite the Government's efforts to build new industries and have 
Bahrainis replace expatriate labor, the creation of new jobs is not kee-
ping up with the flow of school leavers. There is an expanding pool of 
unemployed. 
Government Policies 
In its campaign to foster increased private sector investment the 
government is hoping to attract money into industry, challenging Bah-
rain's traditional preference for investment in trade, commerce or 
foreign assets. The government has also been increasingly active in a 
number of other areas related to industrial development. In fact, despite 
the existence of a relatively informal industrial policy framework, the 
Government of Bahrain has played an important part in sustaining the 
country's industrial development. It is a large investor in key industrial 
projects, but its main instrument of economic intervention is the 
bi-annual budget. 19 
As with other Gulf countries the main budgetary source of revenue 
has been the oil sector. Its share in Government revenue has risen from 
58 percent in 1978 to about 65' percent in 1987 (Table 8). 
In 1987 the government announced preliminary plans to cut back 
government spending over the next five years to compensate for falling 
oil revenues.20 Altogether, around BD105 million ($379 million) is to be 
saved over the period, with the annual figure averaging BD21 million 
($56 million). Recurrent expenditure will be hardest hit, but the 
(18) Ibid. 
(19) United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Industrial Development Review Series, 
Bahrain (Vienna: United Nations, 1986), p. 30. 
(20) Cf. Economist Intelligence Unit, Arabian Peninsula: Economic Structure and Analysis (London: 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 1988), p. 45. 
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Table 8 
Bahrain, Main Components of 
Government Revenue and Expenditure, 1982-1987 
(BD million) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Revenues 560.0 646.0 548.8 533.2 467.6 527.6 
Oil Sector 416.5 498.0 355.4 375.0 247.2 346.0 
(74.4) (77.l) (64.8) (70.3) (52.9) (65.6) 
Duties and Taxes/ 77.0 83.5 118.5 ll8.9 140.l 118.8 
Government Services (13.8) (12.9) (21.6) (22.3) (30.0) (22.5) 
Other 66.5 64.5 74.9 39.4 80.3 62.8 
(l l.9) (I0.0) (13.6) (7.4) (17.2) (l 1.9) 
Current Expenditures 297.8 320.7 328.6 344.2 346.9 346.0 
(53.2] (58.7] (61.0] (67.7] (71.2] (66.6] 
Salaries 149.3 166.8 200.0 207.0 221.5 
[26.7] [30.5) [37.2] [40.7] [45.5) (216.1) 
Other 148.5 153.9 128.6 137.2 125.4 147.9 
[26.5) [28.2] (23.9] [27.0) [25.7] [27 .1) 
Development 
Expendeiture 262.2 225.5 210.0 164.3 140.3 182.4 
(46.8] (41.3] (39.0] (32.3] (28.8) (33.4] 
TOTAL EXPENDITURES 560.2 546.5 538.0 508.5 487.3 546.4 
Deficit/ surplus -0.2 99.5 10.8 24.7 -20.0 -18.8 
Sources: Ministry of Finance and National Economy, 1982-86 Development Plan; Bah-
rain Monetary Agency, Annual Report, various issues. 
Note: ( ) indicates percent of revenues. 
[ ) indicates percent of expenditures. 
government has said it will not cut jobs. Capital expenditure for non-
essential development projects is also targeted for reductions, possibly 
by up to BD40 million ($106 million) during the five year period. 
Recurrent expenditure has risen in recent years, from BD328.6 mil-
lion ($874 million) in 1984 to BD346.9 million ($922.8 million) in 1986, 
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but capital spending has fallen over the three year period from BD210 
million ($558.6 million). In a recent study on the Bahraini economy, 
published in September 1987, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
urged the government to reduce its public sector expenditure, which it 
said was wasting financial resources. The IMF noted that civil servants 
account for 9.6 percent of the total population in Bahrain compared 
with an average of 3 percent for non-oil exporting countries.21. 
The government has made some attempts to deal with the conditions 
brought on by the post 1982 oil price declines. In September 1986 a 
package of economic and legislative reforms was announced which 
spanned reductions in the banks' maximum lending rates and in com-
pulsory social insurance contributions. Domestic and international 
telecommunication charges and municipality taxes were cut substan-
tially, a date set for the opening of a stock exchange. re-export fees were 
abolished and the red tape attached to foreign worker labor permits 
eased.22 
The cost of doing business in Bahrain has fallen as a result of these 
reforms, particularly when considered together with the recent declines 
in property rents and construction. The opening of the King Fahad 
Causeway has also initiated a slide in the cost of many consumer pro-
ducts to a level approaching that of Saudi Arabia. 23 
Revenue constraints and a conservative economic philosophy have 
made the government very receptive to domestic and foreign private 
investment. It has concerned itself almost exclusively with the task of 
providing the necessary infrastructure (water, power, good communi-
cations) and a liberal business environment to attract firms interested in 
regional transitions.24 This bias is investment accounting for up to 24 
percent of GDP, against government's share of 9-13 percent, while 
GNP totals only about four-fifths of GDP, reflecting the high level of 
net factor income outflows. 
In 1982 Bahrain launched is first four-year economic and social deve-
lopment plan (1982-85). Specific emphasis was placed on development 
(21) Cited in Economist Intelligence Unit, Arabian Peninsula: Economic Structure and Analysis 
(London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1988), p. 45. 
(22) "Bahrain", Arab Industry Review 1987/88, p.99. 
(23) Ibid. 
(24) Arab Banking Corporation, The Arab Economies: Structure and Outlook, second revised 





of social service infrastructure and service-related industries and on rai-
sing agricultural production. As development of the heavy industrial 
sector was to be up to 75 percent externally funded, it did not represent 
a major feature in the plan's expenditure targets. Overall aims of the 
plan were to forge greater cooperation between various sectors of the 
economy so as to optimize the use of available human and financial 
resources. 
The specific objectives were defined as follows: 25 
1. To broaden the economic base by expanding and diversifying eco-
nomic activities. 
2. To increase production, particularly of agricultural livestock in order 
to achieve a reasonable degree of self-sufficiency in vegetables, milk 
products, meat and fish by reduced dependence on basic good 
imports. 
3. To improve and expand social services in education, health and hou-
sing. 
4. To rationalize consumption and encourage saving and investment in 
order to further invest in production and 'generalize development and 
progress. 
5. To achieve complementarity and balance among the different sectors 
of the economy. 
Investment and implementation priorities were as follows: 
1. Top priority was accorded to the completion of ongoing projets. 
2. Emphasis was put on productive projects and infrastructure projects 
such as water, electricity, housing, clothes, airport, sea-ports and 
communications. 
3. Priority was given to the improvement and expansion of social ser-
vices, particularly education and training, public health and educa-
tion geared towrds development. 
4. Finally encouragement was given to research and surveying to iden-
tity and develop further national material and human resources. 
(25) State of Bahrain, Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Directorate of PlanniQg and Eco-
nomic Affairs, The Four-Year Programme of Economic and Social Development for the Years 
1982-1985 (Manama, Bahrain: Government Printing house, Ministry of Information, 1982). p. 4. 
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The total cost of the Four-Year programme of economic and social 
development amounted to BD 856 million with infrastructure receiving 
by far the greatest share (Table 9). 
1'' Table 9 
Bahrain: Economic and Social Develpment Program, 1982-86 
(BD million) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Percent of 
Total 
Infrastructure 122.7 204.5 184.1 126.0 49.3 71.7 
Electricity 44.3 62.7 75.5 43.5 11.0 22.9 
Water and Sewage 29.9 52.6 52.5 27.3 67.7 18.7 
Housing 25.5 39.4 51.2 40.0 8.7 17.2 
Roads 10.7 18.3 11.7 8.5 5.4 5.7 
Ports and Airport 6.4 18.1 5.4 3.4 3.7 3.9 
Other 5.9 13.4 5.8 3.3 3.8 3.4 
Social Services 15.8 21.2 16.8 27.6 28.4 11.5 
Education 7.4 10.6 7.1 9.4 8.6 4.5 
Health 3.7 3.7 2.1 6.6 9.0 2.6 
Other 4.7 6.9 7.6 11.6 10.8 ,4.3 
Economic Services 3.3 8.8 10.5 11.6 11.9 4.8 
Agriculture 2.2 3.7 2.6 3.4 7.6 2.0 
Industry 1.1 3.5 6.4 5.7 1.8 1.9 
Other 
Administration 22.5 12.3 15.1 19.6 7.3 8.0 
Defense 21.4 9.7 10.2 9.3 3.3 8.0 
Other 1.1 2.6 4.9 10.3 4.0 2.4 
Other 10.4 12.9 5.3 5.0 5.0 4.0 
TOTAL 174.7 259.7 231.9 189.7 101.9 100.0 
Source: Middle East Economic Digest (November 25, 1983). 
In addition a program amounting to BD 11 billion was sanctioned for 
investment in joint ventures in association with the Gulf countries. The 
most important of these were the Bahraini/Saudi Arabia Causeway, 
expansion in the activities of major existing companies and enterprises 
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such as the Bahraini National Petroleum Company, Aluminum Bah-
raini Company (ALBA), the Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard 
(ASRY) on the project of fuel transformation into light products, the 
Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company, the Bahraini Company for 
Wire and Wireless Communications, the Flour Mill Company, and the 
New Arab University. 
The share of the industrial sector in development expenditure depends 
crucially upon the implementation of the joint venture projects in the 
steel, petrochemical, aluminum, and refining sectors. The First Four-
Year Plan envisaged the provision of major infrastructure support to 
these projects. 
In short, indusrial financing depends upon foreign capital inflows, 
government investments and reinvestment of profits by the private 
sector. The main source of investment for the new industrial projects is 
capital - from both the public and private sectors-from the neighboring 
Gulf states. Government investments are financed from oil receipts and 
from the other tax and non-tax revenues-the Government obtains over 
60 percent of its total revenue from the oil sector and a decline in oil 
production is likely to have serious consequences for industrial finan-
cing. 
With typical forthrightness the Bahraini authorities announced in 
1984 that the 1982-86 plan was to be rephased over six years in view of 
the expected shortfalls in public revenue. 
Conclusions 
Bahrain's reputation as the most industrialized of the GCC states no 
longer holds, nor can it rival some of its neighbors in real terms. The 
small size of the local market has not fostered the same degree of light 
industrialization as in Saudi Arabia, for instance, nor has the govern-
ment introduced the range of incentives available in the other Gulf 
states. 
Ten years ago, Bahrain was a fast-growing confident island, respected 
by expatriates in the Gulf as a decent, civilized place. Now it has suf-
fered an extraordinary demoralization, caused by economic decline, 
political tensions and the sense shared by all the oil states of having 
suddenly become much less important in the world. 
Even as early as 1981 in a report published by the Minister of Deve-
lopment and Industry it was noted that: 
"It is no wonder that the industries along the Golf have met and are 
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meeting great difficulties. The only two advantages cheap energy and 
the availability of financial funds-are eroded by the severe climate and 
the limited skilled and unskilled labor based on low productivity. Plans 
were initiated either by bankers with little idea of engineering or by 
engineering firms with little idea of marketing.26" 
Industrialization undertaken in Bahrain and aimed strictly at the 
national market or on a non-integrated basis is handicapped by the 
structural and financial constraints identified above. The only areas that 
seem promising for the future include industries: (a) involved in gathe-
ring and or using associated gas, (b) involved in downstream operations 
from aluminum and petrochemicals, and (c) downstream operations 
from shipbuilding. 
On the brighter side, the country can expect to be one of the main 
beneficiaries of the end of the Gulf war. Increased confidence in the 
region and a growth in trade and project finance should revive the ban-
king system, one of the pillars of the economy. The reconstruction and 
revival in Iran and Iraq will offer fresh opportunities to Bahraini 
industry, particularly aluminum and steel. 
Expansion of the island's heavy industry and petrochemical plants 
was planned long before the Gulf war cease fire began in August 1988. 
As a result the country expects to be able to take advantage of new 
opportunities in the region ahead of its rivals. This may be sufficient to 
temporarily revive the economy. However, longer term solutions will 
have to involve increased integration with the other Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries. 
(26) United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Long-term Prospects of Industrial Deve-
lopment in Bahrain (Vienna: UNIDO, 1981). 
32 
